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LAWRENCE AS AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASE: SODOMY
AND THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
SHELDON BERNARD LYKE*
ABSTRACT
This Article offers an alternate reading of Lawrence v. Texas, the
2003 U.S. Supreme Court case that struck down the Texas sodomy
statute that criminalized private, consensual, and adult same-sex
intercourse. While most scholars discuss Lawrence as a substantive
due process case and struggle to find meaning in the ambiguity of
the decision's language, I propose that Lawrence is better read as an
Eighth Amendment case. This Article argues that the majority opinion
analyzed the constitutionality of the Texas sodomy law as it would
analyze the cruelty and unusualness of a criminal law in an Eighth
Amendment evolving standards of decency case. The Lawrence Court
not only used objective indicators to find a U.S. consensus against
sodomy laws but was also cognizant of foreign nations that refused to
criminalize sodomy. Additionally, I suggest that the Eighth Amend-
ment and the evolving standards of decency were on the minds of the
Justices when deciding Lawrence, and at a minimum, the case was
decided in the amendment's shadow. The Justices were exposed to
an evolving standards of decency analysis in both written briefs and
oral arguments, and the majority opinion used language evocative
of emergence and evolution. I discuss the importance of this alterna-
tive reading of Lawrence and begin a conversation on the possibilities
of extending an evolving standard of decency analysis to issues other
than sodomy and areas beyond criminal law.
* Lecturer, University of Chicago. Ph.D. candidate, Department of Sociology,
University of Chicago. J.D. 1999, Northwestern University School of Law. I appreciate
the constructive criticism and feedback from the Crime & Punishment workshop at the
University of Chicago Law School, specifically its faculty sponsors, Bernard Harcourt
and Thomas Miles and especially its student coordinators, Clark Peters and Danielle
Wallace. This Article would not have been possible without John "Jack" Heinz, my criminal
law professor, who introduced my first year criminal law class to the Eighth Amendment
over our first three weeks in law school via a detailed reading of the U.S. Supreme Court's
1967 ruling in Robinson v. California. Words cannot express my gratitude for the support
of my close friend and colleague, David Martin Ferguson. This Article is dedicated to the
remembrance of Tyrone Garner, who died on September 11, 2006. Please direct comments
or feedback to sblyke@alumni.princeton.edu.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas'
struck down all state laws that criminalized private adult consensual
sexual activity. The views of a majority of Americans had already
shifted toward tolerance of homosexuality,2 despite the fact that al-
most two decades earlier the Court had allowed states to criminalize
gay sex in Bowers v. Hardwick? I suggest that the Lawrence decision
was in touch with an evolved standard of treatment that a majority
of Americans had developed toward gays and lesbians. While the
result in Lawrence is clear, the holding and principles on which it
stands are a bit more ambiguous. This lack of clarity has led a num-
ber of scholars to offer different interpretations of the Court's hold-
ing; however, most seem to converge on the doctrine of due process.4
In this Article, I take into account the evolution of American decency
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. Gary R. Hicks & Tien-Tsun Lee, Public Attitudes Toward Gays and Lesbians:
Trends and Predictors, 51(2) J. HOMOSEXUALITY 57, 66-68 (2006).
3. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Spinning Lawrence, or Lawrence v. Texas and the
Promotion of Heterosexuality, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 249, 251-52 (2005) (questioning the
reach of the Court's opinion in Lawrence under the rubric of substantive due process);
Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1103-04 (2004) (examining
the Court's treatment of liberty as a new approach to substantive due process); Laurence
Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 'Tundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117
HARv. L. REV. 1894, 1896-98 (2008) (examining the interaction between due process and
equal protection).
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with respect to the punishment of gays and lesbians and offer an
additional reading of the Lawrence decision. I argue that Lawrence
was decided using a test remarkably similar to an evolving standards
of decency analysis, and despite its obvious connections to due pro-
cess, the majority opinion has subtle, yet strong, ties to the Eighth
Amendment.
Concerns surrounding cruel and unusual punishment provide
an explanation for the Lawrence decision beyond the somewhat vague
Court-articulated liberty rationale and the scholar-offered due process
and equal protection readings. If we strip the story of Tyrone Garner
and John G. Lawrence' of the complexities of the evolving standards
of decency, what remains is a romantic tale of horribly oppressed liti-
gants, heroic lawyers, and Justices who stood firmly for the rights
of sexual minorities in the face of hostile majority rule. Examining
Lawrence as an evolving standards of decency case complicates this
narrative because it takes into account that the national consensus
toward punishing consensual private homosexual activity had relaxed
and shifted significantly in the years following Bowers.
This Article argues that Lawrence can be read as part of the
Court's Eighth Amendment evolving standards of decency juris-
prudence. First, I explore and comment on the common readings of
Lawrence as a substantive due process case. Next, I provide evidence
that the Court in Lawrence was not only exposed to Eighth Amend-
ment arguments but also deliberated these issues. I then subject
sodomy laws to an evolving standards of decency analysis. In con-
clusion, I address the importance of reading Lawrence from an Eighth
Amendment perspective. This Article differs from legal scholarship
that proposes how famous Court social issues cases should (or could)
have been decided.6 Instead of proposing how Lawrence could have
been written better, I focus on the decision as it stands, suggest an
alternative interpretation, and then explore the possibilities and
productivities that result from this alternate reading.
5. Tyrone Garner and John G. Lawrence were the petitioners in Lawrence v. Texas.
In the Supreme Court opinion, Garner is referred to as "Tyron," though it is reported
that Garner preferred his first name to be spelled as "T yrone" with an "e." This Article
uses the spelling that Garner preferred. For more information about the events that led
to the arrest of Garner and Lawrence as well as brief biographical data on the men, see
Douglas Martin, Tyron Garner, 39, Plaintiff in Sodomy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,2006,
at D8.
6. See, e.g., WHATBROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATIONSHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S
Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CMIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M.
Balkin ed., 2001) (including many experts' revisions of and thoughts concerning Brown
v. Board of Education).
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I. READING LAWRENCE
A. Substantive Due Process: The Usual Reading
The Supreme Court has ruled that a "substantive" feature of the
Due Process Clause allows courts to invalidate laws that are irrational
or unduly infringe upon fundamental rights.' Most legal scholars
categorize Lawrence as a substantive due process case.' This is not
surprising because the Court stated that it would determine "whether
the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct
in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."9
Legal scholars have noted that the majority struck down the
Texas law without characterizing its test for doing so.1" Usually, in
substantive due process cases, courts undertake a two-step analysis
when deciding a statute's constitutionality." First, the court must
determine whether the legislation burdens the exercise of an indi-
vidual's constitutionally-protected fundamental right. 2 In short, it
answers the question: is the right at issue a fundamental right? In
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court ruled that this first step of deter-
mining whether a fundamental right is at issue has two components:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion,".. . and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed ......
Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a "care-
ful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest....
Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide
the crucial "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking". . . that
direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause. 3
7. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-48 (1992)
(describing the doctrine of substantive due process).
8. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
9. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude,
Sexuality and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27,29 (2004) (remarking on the "opaque[ness]"
of the Court's ruling); Pamela Glazner, Comment, Constitutional Law Doctrine Meets
Reality: Don't Ask, Don't Tell In Light of Lawrence v. Texas, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
635, 643-46 (2006) (arguing that the Court in Lawrence undermined the substantive due
process tiered analysis by using ambiguous language).
11. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (describing the
two-step substantive due process analysis used by the Court).
12. Id.
13. Id. (citations omitted).
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As quoted above, Glucksberg holds that courts "must begin with
a careful description of the asserted right" because the "doctrine of
judicial self-restraint requires [a court] 'to exercise the utmost care
whenever [it is] asked to break new ground in this field.""' 4 Not only
must this right be described, but the right must also be deeply rooted
in national history, practice, and tradition.
15
Second, once a court has determined whether there is a funda-
mental right at issue, it must administer the proper standard of re-
view to the challenged legislation. 6 There are two standards that
courts can apply: (1) strict scrutiny or (2) rational basis analysis. 7
Courts decide cases where fundamental rights are at issue using
a strict or heightened scrutiny analysis. 8 This standard requires
that regulations that limit fundamental rights must be justified by
a compelling state interest.9 Even when there is a compelling state
interest, the Court has ruled that the legislative enactment must be
narrowly tailored to the state's interest.20 The strict scrutiny standard
is a high burden for the government to meet.2' Regulations and laws
subjected to strict scrutiny analysis are usually overturned.22
If a court concludes that no fundamental right is at issue, then it
uses a rational basis analysis.23 Under this test, a court asks whether
the law is rationally related to some legitimate government interest.
24
The rational basis standard is a low bar.25 Laws are usually upheld
under this standard of review.26
14. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
15. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
16. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 794-95 (3rd ed. 2006).
17. Id.
18. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
19. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
20. Id.; Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964).
21. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 540-43 (discussing the levels of scrutiny used
in examining the constitutionality of government action).
22. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (finding the use of strict scrutiny to be "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact"). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 796 (2006) (finding that
thirty percent of strict scrutiny applications result in the challenged law being upheld).
23. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993).
24. Id. at 320.
25. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 540-43 (discussing the levels of scrutiny used
in examining the constitutionality of government action).
26. Id. at 320-21 (describing the presumption of constitutionality and other devices
that make the rational basis test a low standard).
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B. Moving Beyond Substantive Due Process: Alternative Readings
A number of elements of the Court's analysis suggest that
Lawrence may not be a true substantive due process case. First, the
Court in Lawrence did not go through the exercise of describing the
liberty interest at issue. Instead, the Court overturned the Texas sod-
omy law based on its conclusion that, in the United States, individuals
possess a liberty interest in private sexual conduct,2" but the Court
did not explicitly determine whether the right or the liberty interest
was fundamental or announce which type of substantive due process
review standard it used.28 This is a departure from many of the Court's
previous substantive due process rulings, such as Glucksberg.29
Additionally, the Lawrence majority wrote of an "emerging aware-
ness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex."30 Acknowledging an "emerging awareness" is striking consid-
ering that substantive due process determines whether a right is
"fundamental" by objectively examining history and tradition.3'
Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence correctly points out a contradic-
tion between this language and earlier substantive due process pre-
cedent. He writes that "an 'emerging awareness' is by definition not
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition [s],' as we have
said 'fundamental right' status requires."32 There is an apparent
inconsistency here: how can a right exist - which is supposed to be
fundamentally entrenched in our nation's history and tradition -
when we are simultaneously experiencing its emergence?
A number of legal scholars have both directly and indirectly
tried to make sense of this contradiction between the standard of re-
view used in earlier substantive due process cases and the emerging
awareness standard used in Lawrence. Eskridge and Hunter avoid the
necessity of looking for a deeply rooted tradition.33 In their opinion,
the majority did not find a fundamental right and instead applied
a rational basis test,34 and the Texas sodomy statute could not meet
even this low level of scrutiny. In a separate piece, Hunter argues
27. Id. at 578.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (finding no funda-
mental right to assisted suicide and therefore applying rational basis review).
30. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
31. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
32. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER,
AND THE LAw 93 (2d ed. 2003).
34. Id.
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that Lawrence is a shift to "a more flexible analytical structure for
evaluating substantive due process claims." 35 According to this view,
Lawrence is a departure from the rigid "tier" approach to a sliding
scale analysis.36
This view, however, does not explain the importance of the
Court's reliance on the "emerging awareness" of liberty. A sliding
scale approach would only be concerned with whether a right was
rooted, somewhat rooted, partially rooted, or not rooted at all. But
there is something about the language of "emergence" that speaks to
the possibility that the Court may be moved in some meaningful way
by the evolution of society or a change in public attitudes. Sunstein
makes a similar point when reading Lawrence as a case of simple
autonomy. He writes, "It does appear that the Court was responding
to, and requiring, an evolution in public opinion - something like a
broad consensus that the practice at issue should not be punished."37
Sunstein's work seems to tap into the Court's recognition of a shift
in society. He argues that the Lawrence decision can be read as a pro-
cedural due process variation of the common law idea of desuetude -
the idea that laws that are rarely enforced lapse because they lack
public support.3" There is a problem with a desuetude reading, how-
ever: such an interpretation could lead to a precedent where any law
that is rarely enforced becomes invalid. Sunstein acknowledges that
this is problematic, especially for laws that forbid domestic violence
and marital rape in jurisdictions where they are poorly enforced.39
Additionally, even if the Court articulated a desuetude reading that
only struck down criminal laws that were rarely enforced because
of the lack of public support, how would courts determine whether
society supports a law?
The "American-style" desuetude of which Sunstein writes is sim-
ilar to the Court's Eighth Amendment evolving standards of decency
jurisprudence. Unlike the common law desuetude reading, the evolv-
ing standards of decency analysis uses objective indicia to assist
courts in assessing societal support for a law.4" I argue that reading
35. Hunter, supra note 4, at 1118.
36. Both Hunter and Sunstein discuss a possible shift to a "sliding scale" analysis in
substantive due process and equal protection doctrines. See id. at 1131; Sunstein, supra
note 10, at 48.
37. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 49.
38. Id. at 49-50.
39. Id. at 51.
40. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (stating that review under the
Eighth Amendment "should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible
extent") (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Lawrence as an Eighth Amendment evolving standards of decency
case allows for the inclusion of examinations of a national consensus
and the "emerging awareness" of liberty interests. It is the influence
of this amendment that I explore in the next section.
II. READING LAWRENCE AS AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASE
In 1986, Justice Lewis Powell foretold of America's consensus
opinion on same-sex sodomy at the beginning of the twenty-first
century. In his concurring opinion in Bowers, he wrote, 'The Georgia
statute... authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years
for a single private, consensual act of sodomy. In my view, a prison
sentence for such conduct - certainly a sentence of long duration -
would create a serious Eighth Amendment issue."41 Social science
data suggests that America's views in the new millennium are con-
gruent with Justice Powell's. In 1986, when asked, "Do you think
homosexual relations between consenting adults should or should
not be legal," 33% of respondents thought that homosexual relations
should be legal, compared with 54% who thought they should not be
legalized.42 In contrast, by May 2003, the positive response reached
60% (an increase of 27%), while 35% were opposed.43 Before the
Court issued the Lawrence decision in June 2003, many Americans'
views had shifted and it is safe to say that, like Justice Powell, most
Americans would have opposed a prison sentence for consensual,
adult, sexual activity.
We can begin to see connections between Powell's concurrence
and the evolution of America's attitudes toward sodomy if we consider
Supreme Court jurisprudence from the years immediately preceding
and following the Lawrence decision. During this time, the Supreme
Court was busy developing its Eighth Amendment evolving standard
of decency jurisprudence in two high profile death penalty cases. The
41. Bowers v. Hardwick, 498 U.S. 186, 197 (1986).
42. See Hicks & Lee, supra note 2, at 66-67. It is unclear when during 1986 this survey
was administered and whether the Bowers ruling and the media coverage associated
with the case led to a decline in tolerance towards homosexuals. The 33% of 1986 respon-
dents who believed that homosexual relations should be legal was a decline from three
previous years with reported data (1977, 1982, and 1985). In those years, the percentages
of respondents who believed that homosexual activity should be legal were 43%, 45%,
and 44%, respectively. Id. If one believes that the 1986 decline was an anomaly, then one
could argue that Justice Powell's concurrence actually reflected national consensus.
Though a majority of Americans did not support the legalization of consensual homosexual
activity, none of these surveys found that a majority of respondents believed it should
be illegal. Prior to 1986, the highest percentage of respondents, in any year, who thought
that same-sex activity should not be legal, was 47%. Id.
43. Id. at 67.
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Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia44 in 2002, striking down
laws that permit the execution of convicts with mental retardation.
In 2005, the Court decided Roper v. Simmons,45 which held that it is
unconstitutional to administer the death penalty to individuals con-
victed for crimes they committed while under the age of eighteen.
Legal scholarship often covers these death penalty cases and the
Lawrence decision in separate passages alongside each other as part-
ners in chronology alone rather than as part of the same story.4" This
is understandable in some ways because Atkins and Roper are Eighth
Amendment cases, while Lawrence was decided on substantive due
process grounds.4" How can Lawrence and the evolving standards of
decency doctrine be understood as part of the same story? These
death penalty cases, Justice Powell's Eighth Amendment analysis,
and America's shifting opinions toward homosexual activity help to
situate sodomy within a specific legal context.
A. The Eighth Amendment and the Evolving Standards of
Decency
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits federal and state governments from inflicting "cruel and un-
usual punishments.""4 Yet the amendment itself does not specify
what acts constitute cruel and unusual treatment.
The Court has ruled that the Eighth Amendment "must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."49 The Court has provided some guid-
ance on how to assess whether standards are evolving. Objective fac-
tors should inform the inquiry to the maximum possible extent.5 °
The Court has observed that the "clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country's [state] legislatures."'"
While objective indicia are important for the analysis of evolving
standards of decency, they do not ultimately determine the outcome
44. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
45. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
46. See, e.g., Adil Ahmad Haque, Lawrence v. Texas and the Limits of Criminal Law,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4-10 (2007) (providing a chronology of death penalty cases
and the history of the proportionality review in the context of the Eighth Amendment).
47. Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
49. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
50. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991).
51. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
2009]
642 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:633
of the controversy. In Coker v. Georgia, the Court stated that the
Constitution contemplates that the judgment of the Justices "will
be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment."52 When deciding whether
the evolving standards of decency prohibited the execution of those
with mental retardation, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia undertook
its analysis by examining the judgments of state legislatures and
then considering reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with the states'
judgments.53
B. The Eighth Amendment and Lawrence
The majority opinion in Lawrence reads like an Eighth Amend-
ment evolving standards of decency case because of its awareness of
U.S. and global consensus when deciding the constitutionality of the
government's regulation of private adult sexual conduct. The Court
used the word "emerging" twice to discuss the liberty interest that pro-
tects consensual adult sexual activity.54 As evidence of an "emerging
recognition" of liberty, the Court noted that, while all fifty states out-
lawed sodomy before 1961, only twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia had sodomy laws when Bowers was decided.5
Lawrence not only argued that the "emerging recognition" of
liberty existed when Bowers was decided, but that recognition
strengthened in its aftermath.56 The Court implied that a national
consensus, captured in the states' responses following the Court's
1986 announcement, showed the error of the Bowers holding.57 The
majority in Lawrence wrote that "[t]he 25 States with laws prohibiting
the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced
now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual
conduct." 5
The majority in Lawrence used a national consensus to support
its argument by illustrating that few states have laws that single
out same-sex sexual activity for criminal prosecution.59 The Court
noted that prior to the 1970s, no state singled out homosexual activ-
ity and since then "only nine states have done so."6 0 The Court also
52. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
53. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-13 (2002).
54. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
55. Bowers v. Hardwick, 498 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986).
56. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73.
57. Id. at 573.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 570.
60. Id.
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wrote of the trend of states to move toward abolishing these same-
sex prohibitions.61
The use of the word "emergence" is reminiscent of language
used in the Atkins decision to recognize a national consensus in deter-
mining the standard of decency with regard to executing those with
mental retardation. In Atkins, the Court stated that the significant
number of states abolishing the death penalty for criminals with
mental retardation, along with the consistency of the direction of
change toward prohibiting this type of punishment, was important
in ruling the punishment unconstitutional.62 When put side-by-side,
it is clear that the Court in both Atkins and Lawrence performed an
Eighth Amendment evolving standards of decency analysis. Both de-
cisions examined the number of states abolishing a particular crim-
inal act when deciding the constitutionality of a criminal law. The
major difference between the two cases is that the Lawrence opinion
never articulated its legal analysis as an Eighth Amendment inquiry.
C. Exposure to the Evolving Standards of Decency
One should not be surprised that Lawrence reads as though it
was written in light of the evolving standards of decency doctrine.
There is substantial evidence that the Court was exposed to the doc-
trine during the Lawrence case and contemplated it in their decision-
making process. We see examples of exposure and deliberation in
(1) the Court's recent case history, (2) the arguments submitted to
the Court in briefing Lawrence, (3) the Justices' questions during oral
arguments, and (4) the shift in Justice Kennedy's approach to the
Eighth Amendment.
Much of the "evidence" that I present to support my argument
is circumstantial. There is no direct link or smoking gun, such as
letters from a Justice or an interview with a law clerk, that will
demonstrate decisively that the Eighth Amendment was pivotal in
deciding Lawrence. This is not particularly problematic, however,
because the work of judicial decision making is interpretive and not
an exact science of precision. Pointing to the circumstances that sur-
round a judge's decision works to acknowledge the context of the
times and is valuable in understanding the interpretation.
Moreover, my argument that Lawrence can be read as an Eighth
Amendment case does not demand that the Justices were conscious
of the importance of the evolving standards of decency. The Justices
61. Id.
62. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002).
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may have been unaware that the doctrine influenced their think-
ing and therefore would be unable to refer to its influence. Simply
put, my argument is that Lawrence was decided in the shadow of the
Eighth Amendment and that changes in the Justices' views toward
crime, punishment, and decency were of great significance to the
majority opinion.
1. Previous Term, Atkins v. Virginia
In the term before Lawrence was decided, the Court decided
Atkins v. Virginia, which used the evolving standards of decency doc-
trine to rule that the execution of mentally retarded individuals was
an Eighth Amendment violation."3 One could argue that the Atkins
case and the evolving standards of decency doctrine were fresh in
the minds of the nine Justices when they decided the Lawrence case
a year later.
Although it did not use the same constitutional test as Lawrence,
Atkins performed a similar analysis. In Atkins, the Court looked to
the number of states that had eliminated the death penalty for in-
mates with mental retardation in order to understand society's direc-
tion of change on the issue.' In addition, the Court made note of the
uncommonness of the death penalty, even in those states that allowed
the execution of mentally retarded individuals."5
2. Briefs Before the Court
Second, the briefs before the Justices in Lawrence argued whether
Atkins and the Eighth Amendment evolving standards of decency doc-
trine were important in reaching a decision on the substantive due
process claim. 6 Briefs in favor of ruling the Texas sodomy decision
unconstitutional argued for an analysis that considered the evolving
standards of decency doctrine; 7 briefs in favor of upholding the sod-
omy legislation argued against the use of the decency doctrine. 8
For example, the petitioners wanted the Court to look to the
majority of states that had abolished their sodomy laws.69 In their
brief, they wrote:
63. Id. at 321.
64. Id. at 314-16.
65. Id. at 316.
66. Brief for the Respondent at 14-16, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102); Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 22-24, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102).
67. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 66, at 22-24.
68. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 66, at 15-16.
69. Brief for the Petitioner at 22-24, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102).
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The "consistency of the direction of change" among the States...
is indicative of a strong national consensus reflecting profound
judgments about the limits of government's intrusive powers in
a civilized society. The principles and sentiments that have led the
States to eliminate these laws are yet another objective indicator
of the fundamental interests at stake .... Legislative repeals
reflect the same deep-seated values.7 °
In this instance, the petitioners used an Eighth Amendment evolving
standards of decency argument to shed light on the question of sub-
stantive due process.' The petitioners attempted to use the evolving
standards of decency relating to states' punishment of sodomy as evi-
dence of the substantive due process heightened scrutiny requirement
for fundamental rights that are deeply rooted in society. 2
The State of Texas, the respondent in the Lawrence case, argued
against the petitioners' attempt to introduce references to a national
consensus of states that have eliminated their sodomy laws.73 First,
the respondent argued that "only one direction of change [was] pos-
sible" because every state, prior to 1961, criminalized sodomy.74 Sec-
ondly, the respondent confronted the use of the Eighth Amendment
and the evolving standards of decency doctrine head on:
In any event, currently evolving standards are an unstable basis
for recognition of fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Eighth Amendment has long been construed
to require consideration of "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society".... In contrast, none of
this Court's precedents so much as suggests that recent legisla-
tive activity should be accepted as proof of "deeply rooted" funda-
mental rights, and the Court's decisions exploring the possible
existence of unrecognized liberty interests under the Fourteenth
Amendment have never taken into account rapidly "evolving stan-
dards." The approach advocated by the petitioners would require
this Court to serve as a micro-managing super-legislature, contin-
ually assessing current legislative trends to determine the current
extent of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment - an
approach which is entirely inconsistent with the Court's reliance
in Glucksberg upon history and legal tradition."
70. Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
71. See id. at 17-21 (discussing the increasing visibility of gay couples, families headed
by gay persons, and the concomitant decriminalization of private sexual choices by adults).
72. See id. at 22-25 (noting the consistent decline since the 1960s in the number of
states that criminalize sodomy).
73. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 66, at 14-15.
74. Id. at 14.
75. Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
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In contrast, the petitioners argued that history was not a dispositive
objective indicator and
the personal liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clause
is not perpetually frozen in the mold set by the laws of 1868 or
any other bygone age. Nor is the Court's job merely to mirror all
changes around it. The Court must apply its "reasoned judg-
ment" to determine the deeper question of what is required to
protect Americans' ordered liberty today. 6
The petitioner and respondent's debate over the appropriateness
of an evolving standard of decency analysis was not the only instance
when the Court was exposed to the Eighth Amendment argument.
In addition to the parties in the case, several international nongovern-
mental organizations, including Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, filed an amicus brief.77 The brief argued that "in Atkins
v. Virginia, this Court looked to the opinions of "'the world commu-
nity"' to conclude that execution of persons with mental retardation
would offend civilized standards of decency." This amicus brief men-
tioned Atkins and its use of the evolving standards of decency in order
to encourage the Lawrence Court to also look at the world community's
response to sodomy regulation - in order to witness a global human
rights trend calling for equal treatment of persons without regard to
their sexual orientation.79
3. Lawrence Oral Arguments
The oral arguments in Lawrence provide evidence that the Eighth
Amendment and the evolving standards of decency were on Justices'
minds during the deliberative process. In a question to the counselor
for the petitioner, Chief Justice Rehnquist voiced apprehension at
citing a "trend" in a substantive due process analysis of rights that,
in his opinion, are supposed to have historical recognition:
On your substantive due process submission, Mr. Smith, certainly,
the kind of conduct we're talking about here has been banned for
a long time. Now you point to a trend in the other direction, which
would be fine if you're talking about the Eighth Amendment, but
76. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 4, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102).
77. Brief of Mary Robinson et al. at 4-5 as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com
supremescourtbriefs/02-102/02-102.mer.ami.ai.pdf.
78. Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
79. Id. at 18.
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I think our case is like Glucksberg, say, if you're talking about a
right that is going to be sustained, it has to have been recognized
for a long time. And that simply isn't so.'
Another Justice also expressed hesitation to include an evolving
standard in substantive due process law:
Really what's at issue in this case is whether we're going to ad-
here to... what we said in - in Glucksberg, mainly that before
we find a substantive due process right, a fundamental liberty, we
have to assure ourselves that the liberty was objectively deeply
rooted in this nation's history and tradition.
That's what we said in Glucksberg and we've said it in other
cases. Or are we going to depart from that and go to the approach
that we've adopted with regard to the Eighth Amendment, which
is it evolves and changes in - in social values will justify a new
perception of what is called unusual punishment.
Now, why should we - why should we slip into the second
mode? I'm - I mean, suppose all the States had laws against flag-
pole sitting at one time, you know, there was a time when it was
a popular thing and probably annoyed a lot of communities, and
then almost all of them repealed those laws.
Does that make flagpole sitting a fundamental right?"1
The Justices' previous statements illustrate the uneasiness of
some Court members with using an Eighth Amendment analysis in
order to inform a substantive due process ruling. The goal of this sec-
tion, however, is not to show that the Justices accepted the evolving
standards of decency approach that the petitioners advanced. These
transcripts demonstrate that the Justices were aware of the evolv-
ing standards of decency argument, and they deliberated its applica-
tion to the case. Justices use oral arguments to clarify positions, and
sometimes they focus on what they perceive to be weak or strong argu-
ments in order to influence colleagues. If two justices asked questions
regarding the evolving standards of decency during the time con-
straints of a one hour oral argument, then this issue was clearly on
the Court's radar.
4. Justice Kennedy's Shift
As the author of the Lawrence decision, Justice Anthony Kennedy's
shift on the evolving standards of decency, as evidenced in other cases,
80. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102) (italics
added).
81. Id. at 8-9 (italics added).
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is a relevant feature to consider in an Eighth Amendment reading
of Lawrence. Justice Kennedy is an important individual to examine
because of his swing vote in Lawrence. Changes in the swing voter's
decision making can point to possible motivations behind a court's
actions. This section explores Kennedy's evolving understanding of
the Eighth Amendment.
One may argue correctly that Lawrence was not a split decision
because six justices voted to strike the Texas sodomy law.82 Yet, we
must remember that Justice O'Connor did not join the majority opin-
ion and wrote a separate concurring opinion.83 Justice O'Connor did
not change her position from her earlier vote in the Bowers major-
ity. 4 In Lawrence, she voted that the Texas law should be ruled un-
constitutional on equal protection grounds.8 5 This rationale, however,
would seemingly apply only to sodomy laws that were directed against
homosexual conduct and would leave open the possibility that sod-
omy laws that do not distinguish between homosexual and hetero-
sexual conduct might be constitutional.86
Therefore, one could argue that the majority opinion in Lawrence
was a split decision because it only had five votes.8" Of these five jus-
tices, all except Justice Kennedy were considered liberal jurists.88
Justice Kennedy, a conservative-leaning moderate, served as a swing
vote in the Lawrence case. 9 Kennedy's vote in Lawrence, while not
82. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 561.
83. Id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84. See id. at 579.
85. Id.
86. See also id. at 584-85 (declining to decide whether a sodomy law that applied
equally to both heterosexual and homosexual conduct would "violate the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause").
87. The Lawrence majority consisted of Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer.
88. See, e.g., Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy's Move Away From a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation,
30 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 25, 25-27 (2007) (noting that, at the time of Kennedy's appointment
to the Supreme Court in the late 1980s, commentators considered him a reliably conser-
vative justice); Charles Lane, Kennedy Seen as the Next Justice in Court's Middle, WASH.
POST, Jan. 31,2006, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/01/30/AR2006013001356.html?nav-hcmodule (describing the expected com-
position of the court after Justice Alito's confirmation).
89. While Justice O'Connor was often seen as the swing vote during the Rehnquist
Court (when Lawrence was decided) there is considerable evidence of the potential swing
vote power of Justice Kennedy. There are a number of commentaries on the swing vote
nature of Justice Kennedy. E.g., Parshall, supra note 88; Lane, supra note 88, at A4;
Edward Lazarus, The Pivotal Role of Justice Anthony Kennedy: Why The Supreme Court's
Romantic May Only Become More Influential Over Time, FINDLAw, Aug. 7, 2003, avail-
able at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030807.html; Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift:
How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW
YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42.
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a surprise, was also not entirely predictable based on the variance in
his previous votes in cases concerning the rights of homosexuals and
the privacy rights of individuals with regard to personal autonomy
and reproductive decision making. For example, while Kennedy found
that a state constitutional amendment prohibiting any branch of
state government from taking action to protect homosexuals from dis-
crimination violated the Equal Protection Clause in Romer v. Evans,"
he also voted against the expansion of rights to homosexuals when
he ruled to uphold the ban on gay scoutmasters in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale.91
I argue that Kennedy's views on the Eighth Amendment under-
went significant change, and this change had a profound effect on his
vote in Lawrence. I offer two grounds for this argument. First, as pre-
viously mentioned, there are similarities in language between the
majority opinion in Lawrence and the death penalty cases.92 Second,
there is evidence of a significant shift in Kennedy's views on the evolv-
ing standards of decency when one inspects his changing position on
the juvenile death penalty.
The juvenile death penalty serves as an excellent indicator of
Kennedy's changing approach to the evolving standards of decency be-
cause it serves as a natural experiment of sorts. There are two cases -
Stanford v. Kentucky,93 and Roper v. Simmons94 - that consider the
constitutionality of juvenile executions. Kennedy cast a decisive vote
and joined the opinion in Stanford and wrote the majority opinion
in Roper.95 In Stanford, the Court ruled that capital punishment for
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds does not constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment.9" In Roper, the Court ruled that the death pen-
alty for individuals who committed crimes under the age of eighteen
was cruel and unusual.97
In Stanford, Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion
that the juvenile death penalty did not violate the evolving standards
of decency test because, "[o]f the 37 States whose laws permit capital
punishment, 15 decline to impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and
90. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
91. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 642-43 (2000).
92. See supra Part II.B.
93. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
94. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
95. Both Roper and Stanford were five to four decisions. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 554;
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 364.
96. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
97. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79.
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12 decline to impose it on 17-year-old offenders."" Kennedy later
wrote the majority opinion in Roper that overturned Stanford.99 In
departing from Stanford, Kennedy counted states that abolished cap-
ital punishment when determining whether a national consensus
prohibited juvenile executions."0 The number of states that abolished
the juvenile death penalty increased slightly - by only three - in the
sixteen years between Stanford and Roper.101 The overturned deci-
sion may be more a result of a shift in the views of one Justice than
significant changes in the national consensus. While Roper was de-
cided after Lawrence, I argue that Lawrence is a result of a shift in
Kennedy's thinking toward the evolving standards of decency and the
use of foreign authority. The signals of his shift first appeared in
Atkins, continued through Lawrence, and crystallized most promi-
nently in Roper.
Kennedy's views on the evolving standards of decency shifted not
only with respect to the national consensus but also with regard to
the appropriateness of other objective indicators. Kennedy has ruled
that the frequency with which a punishment is imposed, 2 the use
of that practice and attitudes toward it in foreign countries, and the
laws and legal authority of foreign nations' are relevant when deter-
mining public attitude toward a specific sanction. Since the Atkins de-
cision, Kennedy has authored every majority opinion involving the
Eighth Amendment's evolving standards of decency test, and he has
both emphasized and solidified a number of indicia that help courts
objectively evaluate society's standards.' °4
98. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370.
99. Roper, 543 U.S. at 554, 579.
100. Id. at 564.
101. At the time Stanford was decided, twenty-five states either prohibited the death
penalty entirely or did not impose it upon seventeen-year-olds. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 362.
An additional three states prohibited the death penalty for sixteen-year-olds, but not
seventeen-year-olds. Id. When the Court decided Roper, thirty states prohibited the
death penalty for juveniles, including twelve that do not allow the death penalty at all
and eighteen that do not impose the death penalty on juveniles. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
102. The Court in Atkins argues that in states that allow the execution of people with
mental retardation, the practice is uncommon and therefore unusual. The Court cites
this infrequency as evidence of a national consensus. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
316 (2002). In Atkins and Roper, the Court noted that the practice of executing mentally
retarded and juvenile offenders was infrequent. Only five states had executed mentally
retarded offenders between 1989 and 2002. See id. Only three states executed juvenile
offenders between 1995 and 2005. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65.
103. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78.
104. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649-65 (2008) (advocating the
proportionality of the crime to the punishment and respect for human dignity as part of
the evolving standards test); Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61 (listing factors used in the evolving
standards of decency test including "history, tradition, and precedent").
2009] LAWRENCE AS AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASE
III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF STATE SODOMY LAWS
If one can read the Lawrence decision as an Eighth Amendment
case, then it follows that an Eighth Amendment analysis of laws crim-
inalizing sodomy would also have led to a ruling of their unconstitu-
tionality.°5 At the time Lawrence was decided, a national consensus
existed that rejected the criminalization of sodomy. Prior to 1961,
every state in the country banned the practice of sodomy."°6 However,
after examining the most objective indicator of our society's matur-
ing standards - state legislative action - we see that between 1962
and 2003, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia legisla-
tively repealed their criminal sodomy laws.107 An additional six states
had amended or repealed their laws to exclude heterosexual sodomy
from criminal punishment.0 8 Therefore, via the legislative process,
fifty-six percent of states had found it unacceptable to punish any pri-
vate adult consensual acts, and sixty-eight percent of states refused
to criminalize heterosexual acts.0 9 These percentages are similar to,
105. Other articles have discussed the use of the Eighth Amendment as a basis for
challenging sodomy statutes. See Kendall Thomas, Beyond The Privacy Principle, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1431, 1435, 1461-92 (1992) (arguing that "homosexual sodomy statutes
work to legitimize homophobic violence... at the hands of private and public actors");
Melanie C. Falco, Comment, The Road Not Taken: Using the Eighth Amendment to Strike
Down Criminal Punishment for Engaging in Consensual Sexual Acts, 82 N.C. L. REV. 723
(2004); Claude Millman, Note, Sodomy Statutes and the Eighth Amendment, 21 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 267 (1988) (arguing that state courts have misunderstood the limi-
tations the Eighth Amendment imposes on states, curtailing their power to criminalize
certain conduct); J. Drew Page, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Sodomy
Statutes: The Breakdown of the Solem v. Helm Test, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (1989) (focusing
on the proportionality test for determining whether punishment for violation of homosexual
sodomy statutes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). Falco's comment suggests
the use of the evolving standards of decency doctrine as a basis for striking sodomy laws.
Falco, supra, at 723-24. Her analysis, however, is flawed. When counting the number of
states that no longer have sodomy laws, she does not distinguish those states that have
legislatively repealed their sodomy laws from those states that have struck them down
judicially. Id. at 725, 750.
106. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
107. In researching the states that repealed their sodomy laws, Sodomy Laws, Sodomy
Laws in the United States, http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/usa/usa.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2009), was a valuable resource and starting point. This page, as well as the figures
cited in this section, describe the state of sodomy laws at the time Lawrence was decided.
For a list of states and the years their legislatures repealed their sodomy laws (including
those laws that were legislatively repealed after Lawrence was decided), see Table 1,
infra p. 657.
108. For a list of states and the years their legislatures repealed their state sodomy
laws for heterosexuals, see Table 2, infra p. 659.
109. These percentages do not include the District of Columbia. Also, it is important
to note that these percentages are for repeals through the legislative process. Thirteen
state courts have stricken their states' sodomy laws as well. See Table 3, infra p. 660.
Two of these states, New York and Pennsylvania, later repealed their laws legislatively.
See Sexual Assault Reform Act, ch. 1, § 6, 2000 N.Y. Laws 1, 3; Act of Mar. 31, 1995, No.
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if not higher than, the national consensus percentages cited in Atkins
and Roper."0
The Atkins and Roper decisions state that the number of states
that have decriminalized a practice is not as significant as the con-
sistency of the direction of the change in society's evolving standards
of decency."' In the case of sodomy, societal change has been in one
direction - toward the elimination of these criminal statutes.
1 1 2
Furthermore, these laws could be viewed as cruel and unusual be-
cause the few states that still criminalized sodomy when Lawrence
was decided - without legislative or judicial restraint - rarely
arrested or prosecuted couples engaging in these acts." 3
A major factor that may lead to a ruling of unconstitutionality
under an Eighth Amendment analysis is the fact that New York,
Arizona, and Rhode Island were the only states whose sodomy law
repeals were less than five years old when Lawrence was decided." 4
There were a number of states - a total of seven - whose sodomy
laws have been repealed for at least thirty years (Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Ohio, and Oregon) when
Lawrence was decided."' Twenty-one of the twenty-eight states
(seventy-five percent) that repealed their sodomy laws prior to the
Lawrence decision did so at least twenty-five years prior." 6 These
states' extensive experience with the repeal of these laws proved that
these changes had long term viability.
Additionally, as mentioned in Lawrence, many in the world com-
munity (particularly those nations that share our Anglo-American
1995-10 (SS1), § 7, 1995 Pa. Laws 985, 987. For a list of states and the years their courts
struck their sodomy laws, see Table 3, infra p. 660.
110. In considering evidence of a national consensus with regard to the execution of
juvenile offenders, the Court in Roper noted that 47%, or eighteen of the thirty-eight states
that allowed the death penalty at the time, had changed their laws to prohibit such exe-
cutions. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). The percentage is higher (60%) if
one includes the twelve states that prohibited the death penalty altogether. Id. Whichever
percentage is used, the percentages for states that had legislatively repealed their sodomy
statutes at the time Lawrence was decided - 56% for same-sex sodomy and 68% for
heterosexual sodomy - are comparable to (and arguably higher than) the numbers in
Roper. But see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). In Kennedy, the Court
struck the death penalty for individuals convicted of raping a child. The Court ruled that
a national consensus existed that prohibited this punishment for the crime. This decision
was based, in part, on the court's find that 88%, or forty-four states, have not made child
rape a capital offense. Id. at 2652. The percentages in Lawrence are lower than those in
Kennedy.
111. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002); Roper, 543 U.S. at 565-66.
112. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003).
113. Id.
114. See Table 1, infra p. 657.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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heritage and some countries of Western Europe) had invalidated sod-
omy laws because of their irrational animus and prejudice toward
homosexuals." 7 The nation-state signatories of the European Charter
on Human Rights,"' Canada,"' and South Africa 12' are examples of
countries that share a common heritage with the United States, yet
did not criminalize sodomy. These countries' practices would provide
added weight to a finding that sodomy laws are cruel and unusual.
Some might argue that while an Eighth Amendment analysis in
Lawrence might have ruled the severity of the Texas sodomy statute
unconstitutional, it would still allow less severe, nonincarceration
forms of punishment (i.e., smaller fines and citations). Individuals
arguing from this perspective emphasize the proportionality doctrine
of the Eighth Amendment, which condemns "punishments which by
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the
offences [sic] charged."'21 Upon a close analysis, however, it seems
that a Lawrence Eighth Amendment analysis would not allow less
severe forms of punishment for sodomy.
In order to clarify my position, I distinguish two categories of
Eighth Amendment proportionality: procedural and substantive pro-
portionality. The former assumes the presence of a crime and that
acceptable punishments exist. This approach works to determine
whether the crime fits the punishment by comparing how a legisla-
ture punishes other crimes or how other legislatures punish similar
crimes. On the other hand, substantive proportionality does not neces-
sarily assume criminal activity. A substantive proportionality analysis
aims to discover the very nature (i.e., substance) of what constitutes
criminal activity and whether the "crime" at issue deserves any form
of punishment. There are two cases that illustrate the different mani-
festations of proportionality analysis: Weems v. United States22 and
Robinson v. California.12
117. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77.
118. The European Court on Human Rights, interpreting the charter, ruled in Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1981), that sodomy laws violated
rights to privacy.
119. The Canadian House of Commons decriminalized private same-sex acts between
consenting adults on May 15, 1969. R. Douglas Elliott, The Canadian Earthquake: Same-
Sex Marriage in Canada, 38 NEw ENG. L. R. 591, 597 n.23 (2004). Canada has not only
decriminalized sodomy, but also now allows same-sex marriage. See Clifford Krauss, Gay
Marriage is Extended Nationwide in Canada, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at A4.
120. The South African Constitutional Court struck South Africa's sodomy laws in
National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517
(CC) (S. Aft.).
121. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
122. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
123. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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The Weems case is a classic example of procedural Eighth Amend-
ment proportionality. In Weems, the Court struck down a sentence of
fifteen years of incarceration at hard labor with ankle chains, con-
stant surveillance, and loss of civil rights for the crime of falsifying
public documents. 2 4 The Court "condemn[ed]" the sentence as exces-
sive after comparing it to the sentences given for other criminal acts.'25
The Court moved in a slightly different direction in Robinson,
when it set aside a conviction under a law that made it a crime for
an individual to be addicted to narcotics.'26 The Court ruled that the
statute was unconstitutional because it punished the status of addic-
tion.127 The Court's proportionality review was less concerned with
the excessiveness of the sentence than it was focused on whether
addiction was a "thing" or activity that should be punished. 28 The
Robinson Court adjudicated the definition of criminality and grap-
pled with the fundamental question of what things or acts should be
punished.29
I argue that the analysis in Lawrence falls closer to a substantive
proportionality analysis and uses indications of society's evolved stan-
dards of decency to help the Court determine whether sodomy is a
criminal activity. The twenty-eight states that had repealed their
sodomy laws when Lawrence was decided made a statement about the
definition of crime and punishment. By repealing the laws and not
replacing them with some lesser punishment, the legislatures were
signaling that sodomy no longer constitutes a crime. In Lawrence, the
Court does not grapple with the fact that there are different sanctions
that legislatures can use to punish the act of sodomy. Instead, when
making its determination, the Court focused on the fact that sodomy
laws, regardless of the punishment, were repealed.3 ° At issue in
sodomy cases is not the specific punishment but the actual labeling
of the adult consensual sex act as criminal. The fact that the act is
124. Weems, 217 U.S. at 357-58, 364.
125. Id. at 380-81.
126. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
127. Id. There are multiple ways to read the Court's decision in Robinson. In addition
to the narrow ruling that legislatures cannot punish an individual's status (in absence
of some act), Robinson can also be read to stand for the broader proposition that it is cruel
and unusual to punish an individual for conduct that she is unwilling or unable to control.
Though slightly outside the scope of this Article, one can also read Lawrence such that it
fits well within this broader interpretation of Robinson. While some argue that Lawrence
is a case where actions, not status, are punished, others argue that the act of engaging
in sexual activity is intimately linked to one's sexuality and that the distinction between
status and action is meaningless. See Millman, supra note 105, at 269.
128. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
129. Id. at 666-67.
130. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003).
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considered a crime can be interpreted as cruel and unusual by contem-
porary standards. Following this reasoning, an Eighth Amendment
evolving standards of decency analysis would not allow any form of
punishment for sodomy - not even a small fine. The evolving stan-
dards of decency analysis has been used to determine what consti-
tutes cruelty when society punishes crimes. However, the Eighth
Amendment not only addresses how we punish crimes but also what
constitutes a crime worthy of punishment.
CONCLUSION
One could argue that Lawrence stands on weak ground because
the majority did not utilize a traditional substantive due process anal-
ysis (by failing to articulate a well-described right and then applying
the appropriate test). Additionally, just as in the overturned Bowers
case, only five Justices voted for the majority opinion in Lawrence. 131
Depending on which Justice is replaced, just one conservative court
appointment could find the Lawrence opinion overturned or at least
severely modified. The goal of this Article, however, is not to perfect
Lawrence or rewrite the decision, but to view it through a different
lens. Despite its arguably weak rationale, Lawrence probably will not
be overturned because the American public's conception of crime has
evolved in such a way that it does not include private adult same-
sex consensual activities. Instead, I hope that reading Lawrence as
an Eighth Amendment case may serve as the beginning of a conver-
sation on how an evolving standards of decency approach may ad-
vance civil rights for gays and lesbians as well as other marginalized
social groups whose identities, behaviors, and activities have histor-
ically been stigmatized and/or criminalized.
The idea that advocates should move beyond the use of privacy
for protecting homosexuals from government criminalization of their
sexual lives is not new.'32 One alternative could be legal arguments
that analyze society's evolved standards of decency. This could be a
particularly useful approach because unlike privacy rights arguments
that focus largely on the relationship between the individual and the
government, the evolving standards argument incorporates contempo-
rary society into the human rights dialogue. Instead of solely arguing
that government cannot interfere in individuals' lives or discriminate
against gay and lesbian people, an added argument can appeal to
131. Id. at 561.
132. See Thomas, supra note 105, at 1435 (arguing for recognition of a "right to 'corporal
integrity'").
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decency and argue that society no longer finds it acceptable to punish
people in a particular fashion.
Can this approach be extended? In the context of criminal laws,
the evolving standards of decency doctrine has been used to prohibit
loss of nationality,133 but it has been used most often in cases involv-
ing corporal punishment."M By reading Lawrence as an evolving stan-
dards case, we can advocate the use of this approach in other areas
of criminal law, such as fornication.
Another inquiry worthy of exploration is whether this approach
could be extended beyond criminal laws to strike down civil laws that
discriminate against gays and lesbians. Would it be possible to use
an evolving standards of decency analysis on claims against sexual
orientation employment discrimination? Same-sex marriage? The
military's ban on gays? Though not without its problems, it might
be beneficial to explore a legal strategy that moves beyond privacy
arguments when arguing for the expansion of civil rights to employ-
ment or marriage and instead calls upon the decency of society and
humanity.
While this approach has exciting imagined possibilities, it could
be extremely problematic for the protection of minority rights if courts
begin placing majority rule as a fundamental element for discerning
individual rights. The structure of our legal system is to protect the
rights of the minority from the "tyranny of the majority" of which
Mill writes."5 Perhaps a conversation can occur that can analyze the
hybrid nature of the evolving standards of decency analysis, where
the Eighth Amendment acknowledges the complex and multiple
manifestations of the majority and finds instances of the majority's
decency that protect the minority from the majority's other harmful
stances. This is an area that needs more thought, discussion, and
research.
133. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 86 (1958) (holding a portion of the Nationality Act
of 1940 unconstitutional because it is cruel and unusual to revoke the citizenship of a
military deserter).
134. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 357-58, 364 (1910) (finding a
sentence of "hard and painful labor" for fifteen years while wearing an ankle chain to be
cruel and unusual punishment).
135. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) (arguing for the freedom of the individual
against the claims of the state).
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TABLE 1136
SODOMY LAWS LEGISLATIVELY REPEALED FOR ALL
(REGARDLESS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION)
1. Alaska 1980
2. Arkansas 2005137
3. Arizona 2001138
4. California 1975139
5. Colorado 1971140
6. Connecticut 1969141
7. Delaware 1973
8. District of Columbia 1993142
9. Hawaii 1972143
10. Illinois 1961144
11. Indiana 1976145
12. Iowa 1976146
13. Maine 197514'
14. Missouri 2006148
15. Nebraska 1978
16. Nevada 1993
16. New Hampshire 1975149
17. New Jersey 1978150
18. New Mexico 1975
19. New York 2000151
20. North Dakota 1975
136. The year each state's law was repealed was obtained from the individual state's
page at Sodomy Laws, supra note 107, except where otherwise noted.
137. Arkansas Criminal Code Revision Commission's Bill, Act 1994, § 496, 2005 Ark.
Acts 6932, 7446.
138. Tax Equity Act of 2001, ch. 382, § 1, 2001 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2146, 2146.
139. Act of May 12, 1975, ch. 71, § 7, 1975 Cal. Stat. 131, 133.
140. Act of June 2, 1971, ch. 121, § 40-3-411, 1971 Col. Sess. Laws 425.
141. Penal Code, Pub. Act No. 828, §§ 71-81, 1969 Conn. Acts 1554, 1581-83.
142. Anti-Sexual Abuse Act of 1994, D.C. Act. 10-385, § 501(b), 42 D.C. Reg. 53 (Jan. 6,
1995).
143. Hawaii Penal Code, Act 9, §§ 733-35, 1972 Haw. Sess. Laws 32, 90-91.
144. Criminal Code of 1961, § 11-2, 1961 Ill. Laws 1983, 2006.
145. Act of Feb. 25, 1976, Pub. L. No. 148, sec 1, § 35-42-4-2, 1976 Ind. Acts 718,
733-34.
146. Iowa Criminal Code, ch. 1245, 1976 Iowa Acts 549.
147. Maine Criminal Code, ch. 499, § 253, 1975 Me. Laws 1273, 1298-99.
148. Act effective June 5, 2006, H.B. 1698, § 550.090, 2006 Mo. Laws 330, 344.
149. Act of June 7, 1975, ch. 302, 1975 N.H. Laws 273.
150. New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, ch. 95, 1978 N.J. Laws 482.
151. Sexual Assault Reform Act, ch. 1, § 6, 2000 N.Y. Laws 1, 3. The law had previously
been ruled unconstitutional by the state's highest court. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d
936, 937 (N.Y. 1980).
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Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
1972152
1971153
1995 154
1998155
1977
1977
1976
1976156
1983157
1977158
152. Act of Dec. 22, 1972, No. 338, § 1, 1971 Ohio Laws 1866, 1906-11.
153. Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, ch. 743, 1971 Or. Laws 1873.
154. Act of Mar. 31, 1995, No. 1995-10 (SS1), § 7, 1995 Pa. Laws 985, 987. The statute
had previously been ruled unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980).
155. Act of June 5, 1998, ch. 24, 1998 R.I. Pub. Laws 70.
156. Act of Mar. 11, 1976, ch. 43, 1976 W. Va. Acts 241.
157. Act of May 5, 1983, ch. 17, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws 37.
158. Sexual Assault Laws Revision, ch 70, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 228.
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TABLE 2159
SODOMY LAWS LEGISLATIVELY REPEALED FOR HETEROSEXUALS
ONLY
Arkansas
Kansas
Kentucky
Montana
Texas
Tennessee
1975160
1969
1974161
1973
1973
1989
159. The information for this table was obtained from each state's individual page at
Sodomy Laws, supra note 107, except where noted.
160. The law was repealed entirely in 1975 but reinstated in 1977 in a format that
targeted only same-sex acts. Sodomy Laws, Arkansas, http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/
usa/arkansas/arkansas.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
161. Sodomy Laws, History of Sodomy Laws, http:J/www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/history/
history.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
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TABLE 3162
SODOMY LAWS JUDICIALLY RULED INVALID
1. Arkansas 2002163
2. Georgia 1998164
3. Kentucky 1992165
4. Louisiana 2005166
5. Maryland 1998167
6. Massachusetts 2002168
7. Michigan 1990169
8. Minnesota 2001170
9. Montana 1997171
10. New York 1980172
11. North Carolina 2005173
162. This table includes only sodomy laws invalidated by a state court.
163. Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353-54 (Ark. 2002). The statute in question
"condemn[ed] conduct between same-sex actors while permitting the exact same conduct
among opposite-sex actors." Id. at 353.
164. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 23-24 (Ga. 1998) (finding the statute unconsti-
tutional as applied to "a non-commercial sexual act that occurs without force in a private
home between persons legally capable of consenting to the act").
165. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
166. La. Elect. of Gays & Lesbians, Inc. v. Connick, 902 So.2d 1090, 1094 (La. Ct. App.
2005) (finding that portions of the state's statute criminalizing sodomy were unconstitu-
tional after Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
167. Williams v. Maryland, No. 98036031/CC-1059, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260, at *1 (Md.
Cir. Ct. Balt. City Oct. 15, 1998) (enjoining the state from enforcing the state's sodomy
laws against all "consensual, non-commercial, private sexual activity," including between
persons of the same sex); see also Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176, 184 (Md. 1990) (constru-
ing the state's laws prohibiting oral sex as inapplicable to heterosexual conduct so as to
avoid "serious constitutional issues").
168. Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Def. v. Atty. Gen., 763 N.E.2d 38, 40 (Mass. 2002)
("clarify[ing]" that the state's "crime[s] against nature" law does not apply to "acts con-
ducted in private between consenting adults").
169. A Wayne County trial court invalidated the law, and the state declined to appeal.
Sodomy Laws, Michigan, http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/usa/michigan/michigan.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Mich. Org. for Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-815820CZ
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County July 9, 1990)). The state supreme court subsequently
found the statute constitutional against a vagueness challenge. People v. Lino, 527 N.W.2d
434 (Mich. 1994).
170. In re Proposed Petition to Recall Hatch, 628 N.W.2d 125, 126 (Minn. 2001) (recog-
nizing that Minnesota's sodomy law had been ruled unconstitutional).
171. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 126 (Mont. 1997).
172. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936,938-39 (N.Y. 1980). The statute was subsequently
repealed by the New York State Assembly. Sexual Assault Reform Act, ch. 1, § 6, 2000
N.Y. Laws 1, 3.
173. State v. Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d 576, 581 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (finding the state's
'crime against nature" statute unconstitutional as applied to consenting adults after
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
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12. Pennsylvania 1980174
13. Tennessee 1996175
174. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980). The statute was subse-
quently repealed by the Pennsylvania GeneralAssembly. Act of Mar. 31, 1995, No. 1995-10
(SS1), § 7, 1995 Pa. Laws 985, 987.
175. Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
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